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DDI- 04261-84/1

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Hugh Montgomery
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

SUBJECT: The Prospects for Iran

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum of 23 July 1984, Same Subject

1. We received your series of questions on the evolving situation in Pakistan about which Ken Dam has expressed interest. The points raised in your memorandum are actually going to be treated in an estimate on Iran that we have underway for late August. I understand that INR will, in fact, be supplying the drafter.

2. We had been hoping to prepare an estimate on these and other issues somewhat sooner but delayed the paper because DDI/NESA is in the process of completing a key paper based on much new research on the nature of the opposition to Khomeini. We felt that any estimate would need to draw on this paper.

3. The questions Ken raises are good ones. We are tentatively planning to cover roughly the following areas in our proposed estimate.

- Who are the main players in Iranian politics below the top level both clerical and civilian?
- What is the opposition to Khomeini, both domestic and foreign?
- What has been the impact upon Tehran of internal economic, social, and political pressures and external developments, particularly the war?
- What will the role of the military be in a future succession, both Red Guard and regular Army?

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- What is likely to occur after Khomeini dies?
- What are current Soviet tactics towards Iran as well as longer range intentions and capabilities?
- Implications for the US?

4. I would hope to have this estimate ready for NFIB in late September.


Robert M. Gates
Chairman

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON

DDI- 04261/84

July 23, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: The Prospects for Iran

356,
INR recently pulled together the totality of information on the shelf in the Intelligence Community on Iran for Ken Dam. He found the results disappointingly thin in terms of our knowledge of the personalities below the most senior level of the clerics, and our understanding of how the political system functions, particularly the relationships and tensions between the clerics and the civilians, in the Majlis for example.

Ken has asked that the Intelligence Community be tasked to do a paper which in fact addresses the following points:

- Who are the movers and shakers of the Iranian body politic below the senior level of the mullahs?
- What are the political dynamics of this society, and what are the prospects for the succession when the Ayatollah goes to his great reward?
- Is it accurate, for example, to speak of a "pro-West faction" in the Iranian body politic, and if so, who are these people and what is their political weight?
- Are there, in the perception of the Intelligence Community, gestures which the West (or the United States) might make to ensure an open door or at least a door ajar when the successor generation takes over?
- What are current Soviet tactics towards Iran, and how successful have they been in maintaining some form of dialogue? What are Soviet goals, and what are the prospects for the Soviet-Iranian relationship after the Ayatollah?

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At your convenience, please let me know what you believe to be feasible in this connection, together with your preliminary thoughts on when such a paper might be ready for Ken Dam's consumption.

Thank you for your help.


Hugh Montgomery

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